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This paper shows that the results Walsh (2000) obtains are highly sensitive to the 
assumption that different wage contracts are based on different information sets 
even though they are negotiated simultaneously. In particular, the power of future 
expectations to discipline an opportunistic central banker is much weaker when 
homogeneous information sets are used. 
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1. Introduction 
In a recent article in this journal, Carl E. Walsh (2000) extends the monetary game 
theoretic model in Cukierman and Liviatan (1991) to show that the mix of short- and long-
term wage contracts in an economy that features a Lucas-type supply function has effects on 
optimal inflation choices that are not captured in uniform wage setting models. Walsh shows 
that in an incomplete information context where some central bankers can commit but others 
cannot, the introduction of forward-looking inflation expectations acts as a disciplinary 
device, reducing the inflationary bias
1 and forcing the weaker type to postpone inflationary 
surprises. In this framework, strong types make inflation choices so as to accommodate 
adverse expectations and in some cases they manage to prevent the economy from undergoing 
recession, a result that was firstly due to Cukierman and Liviatan (1991).  
Several results highlighted in Walsh are sensitive to an implicit assumption that 
different sectors in the economy have different information sets. In his model, wage setters 
that negotiate short-term nominal contracts base their decisions on past expectations of 
current inflation, following  Barro and Gordon (1983). On the other hand, wage setters 
negotiating long-term contracts know current inflation and thus base their contracts on current 
expectations of future inflation, following Taylor (1979) and Calvo (1983).  
Under homogenous information sets, the inflationary bias is higher. Inflation 
persistence endogenously affects the output gap, in spite of the assumption that expectations 
are forward looking, and past expectations of current inflation are still more important than 
future expectations. As a result, the channel for the market to discipline the central banker 
predicted in Walsh (2000) will generally not operate.  
The predictions for economic growth under discretion or commitment are also 
different. Under commitment, for instance, a strong type central banker is sometimes able to 
generate economic expansion in the second period of a pooling equilibrium. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the expectations setting in 
Walsh and proposes an alternative framework. Section 3 presents the new optimal choices of 
inflation and the predictions for the output gap under the separating and pooling equilibria. 
Finally, the last section concludes the paper.   5
2. Changing the Expectations Setting 
The reader is referred to Walsh (2000) for the basic set up. There are two types of 
contracts. Contracts of type A are signed every period. Type B long-term contracts are signed 
every other period, and are divided into types B1 and B2, differing only on the time they are 
negotiated. As in Walsh (2000), at the beginning of period t, type A contracts are negotiated 
based on past expectations of current inflation, and, hence their information set is [] 1 − t I . Type 
B1 contracts are also negotiated at the beginning of period t, but distinctly from Walsh we 
assume that they are based on past expectations of current and future inflation. Therefore, the 
present value of the expected real wage in logs, in sector B1, yields 
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  This latter equation differs from the one that appears after equation (14) in Walsh 
(2000) as he implicitly assumed that B1-type contracts were based on the information set [It], 
i.e., based on information available at the end of period t. Sector B1 would thus have better 
information than sector A, although both signed contracts at the same time.  
It does not seem natural to argue that some sectors are able to observe inflation rates 
before others, as inflation rates are usually public.
2 Even under the assumption that 
simultaneously signed contracts may have heterogeneous information sets, the choice of 
which sector should have better information is highly arbitrary. In fact, if Walsh had chosen 
sector A to have better information than sector B1, there would be no surprise at all in sector 
A and contracts would display perfect foresight. But then, sector A would not affect the 
equilibrium of the monetary policy game and should have been removed. 
                                                                                                                                                          
1 This result was also obtained in Goodhart and Huang (1998) with a model that assumed real output persistence, 
overlapping multi-period wage contracts and monetary policy lags. 
2 A counter argument to this point could follow Woodford (2002), who argues that decision-makers may not be 
fully aware of all information that is made public, which could result in heterogeneous information sets. 
However, distinctly from Walsh (2000), in Woodford decision-makers act strategically, and high order 
expectations matter for optimal pricing policy. In that environment, the assumption of limited capacity to filter 
information generates more sluggish responses of the expectations to shocks, which in turn may cause more 
persistence of real effects of nominal shocks. In contrast, the heterogeneity of information sets in Walsh (2000) 
causes less persistence to inflation surprises in the model.   6
Therefore, in order to make the informational structure homogeneous among sectors 
that sign contracts at the same time, and also nontrivial, we assume that both sectors A and B1 
have access to the same information set  [It− 1] when they sign their wage contracts. 
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π π . Sector B2 negotiates two period contracts at the 
end of period t− 2. In Walsh the information set of wage setters in this sector is [] 1 − t I . Thus, 
the same argument used above on comparing the expectations setting in sectors A and B1 
applies here. Assuming that the information set in B2 is [] 2 − t I , the real wage and the output 








+ − = − − − − − − t t t t t t t
B
t E E p w π π
ρ
ρ






















π π π 2 1 2 1
2
1 1














































. This equation differs from equation (16) in Walsh mainly 
due to the persistence of inflation (if not perfectly anticipated) affecting the current output 
gap. That result is consistent with the inheritance of rigidity from past wage negotiations. In 
addition, the parameter a , which impacts multiplicatively the output deviation from its 
equilibrium level in both periods, does not depend on the share of sector A, γ , in the total 
number of firms. 
Walsh draws important conclusions from the output gap equation. Some of these 
conclusions, however, do not hold when contracts that are signed at the same time are based 
on the same information sets. For instance, Walsh argues that, when all contracts last for two 
periods (i.e. γ =0), “expectations of future inflation and past expectations of current inflation 
will be equally important”. With homogeneous information sets, past expectations of current 
                                                 
3 All derivations can be obtained from the authors upon request.   7
inflation are almost three times more important than future expectations.
4 Therefore, one 
might expect that the channel for the market to discipline the central banker will not work as 
well as described in Walsh (2000). We turn to that point next. 
 
3. New Equilibrium Results 
We replicate Walsh (2000)’s strategic interaction between society and the central 
bank. By using the new output gap equations, we find that the optimal inflation rates, the 
corresponding sizes of the output gap, and the influence of the heterogeneity of contracts in 
central bank’s decisions are quite different. Although some of the differences follow from the 
presence of an inertial component in the output gap equation that does not exist in Walsh’s 
model, others alter what we consider to be the core of that paper: how the expectations 
channel can discipline an opportunistic central banker.  
Table 1 compares the optimal inflation rates and the influence of the heterogeneity of 
contracts in the optimal decisions. The main differences are briefly discussed below. 
3.1 The impact of multi-period contracts in discretionary inflation rates 
The heterogeneity of contracts is expressed in the model by the variable γ : a higher γ  
implies a higher share of short-term contracts in the economy. Walsh (2000) argues that “a 
smaller γ  reduces the incentives to inflate and lowers the inflationary bias under discretion”. 
This result suggests that an economy with longer-term contracts would systematically exhibit 
lower inflation rates under discretion. Contrary to Walsh (2000), it can be seen from Table 1 
that, in the revised model, 1) the discretionary inflation rate at t+1 is not affected by γ , and 2) 
discretionary inflation at t lowers as the share of short-term contracts increases. 
3.2 The impact of multi-period contracts in announced inflation rates 
A higher share of long-term contracts in the economy generally increases inflation 
under commitment. The one exception is the second period of a pooling equilibrium, when γ  
has no effect in optimal inflation announcements, which also contrasts with Walsh.  
                                                 
4 If γ =0 and ρ   is close to 1, then  ρ   is close to 1/2 and past expectations of current inflation are approximately 




− − +  whereas expectations of future inflation are close to 
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Table 1 
Compared Results of the Models: Sign of Inflation Outcomes
5 
 
3.3. Size of the inflation bias 
Table 2 compares the inflation results in Walsh with those under homogeneous information 
sets. Inflation is higher with homogeneous information sets.
6  
                                                 
5 The superscript a in the tables stands for "announced". 
6 Of course, when contracts are only short term (γ =1), the results obtained here are the same as in Walsh, which 
in turn converge to the standard model of time inconsistency. 
  Walsh (2000)   Revised expectations setting  
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Table 2 
Compared Results of Equilibrium Inflation  
a = Results with homogeneous information sets         b =Walsh (2000)  results    
 
3.4. Output gap predictions 
The predictions for economic growth with homogeneous information sets are not as 
straightforward as those in Walsh (2000). As Table 37 shows, because of the inertial 
component in the output gap equation, the sign of the output gap may depend on the type of 
the previous central banker.  
 Table 3 
New signs for the output gap (0<γ <1, 0<q<1,  9 0. = ρ ) 
Equilibrium Central  banker’s 
type 
Time  Sign of the output gap 
S   t  <0 unless () 2 . 0 , 0.9 or    1 . 0 ≤ = γ q   
W  t  >0 
























W  t+1  >0 unless () 2 . 0 , 1 . 0 ≤ = q γ  or 
[] () 1 . 0 , 5 . 0 , 2 . 0 = ∈ q γ  
S and W  
(with W at t− 1) 
t  >0 unless() 5 . 0 , 4 . 0 ≤ ≤ γ q or () 6 . 0 , 5 . 0 ≥ ≤ γ q  
S and W  
(with S at t− 1) 
t  <0 unless () 3 . 0 , 9 . 0 ≤ = γ q  





















W  t+1  >0 
 
Incomplete information in this model may force the economy into recession under a 
weak type central banker. Episodes of high inflation delivered under discretionary monetary 
policy and economic recession were common in the 80’s in several countries worldwide. 
Although a deeper investigation of the institutional framework would be needed to link these 
                                                 
7 Matlab numerical calculations were used in order to obtain the results in table 3. The corresponding programs 
can be obtained upon request to the authors. 
separating pooling  Equilibrium 
W
t π  
W
t 1 + π  
a
t π  
a
t 1 + π  
a
t π  
a
t 1 + π  
a− b (γ <1)  0 >   0 >   0 >   0 >   0 >   0 >    10
stylized facts with the revised model, it is interesting to note that the model might be able to 
replicate a wider range of real world problems. 
In Walsh, the output gap in the first period of the separating equilibrium under 
commitment can take positive, null or negative values, but the conditions for each of these 
cases are quite different from the ones obtained with homogeneous information sets.  
3.5. Market power to discipline an opportunistic central bank 
An important difference, which changes what we consider to be the core of Walsh 
(2000), is the influence of the heterogeneity of contracts in the likelihood of the pooling 
equilibrium. Walsh argues “the greater the prevalence of multi-period wage contracts, the 
more likely it is that pooling results”. Later in the paper, the author goes on further to say that 
a higher k (which is decreasing with γ ) will force the opportunistic central bank to be patient, 
and make the separating equilibrium unlikely. As a result, “market discipline may serve to 
constrain the behavior of the central bank, forcing the central bank to ‘do the right thing’”.  
We found that this argument holds only for heterogeneous information sets. With 
homogeneous information sets, the pooling equilibrium is very unlikely. With standard 
discount rates ( 9 . 0 ≥ ρ ), pooling exists only for very high credibility levels and a relatively 
high share of short-term contracts
8. Therefore, the present model predicts that the weak 
central banker will usually not mimic the strong one in a pooling equilibrium, and thus the 
expectations channel derived from multi-period wage contracts loses the disciplinary property 
highlighted in Walsh (2000). 
 
4. Conclusion 
The assumption that different wage contracts signed simultaneously have different 
information sets is crucial for Walsh (2000) to conclude that forward looking expectations are 
an important disciplinary device for central bankers. The present article shows that, with 
homogeneous information sets, pooling equilibria will generally not occur, so that the 
disciplinary channel will be lost.  
                                                 
8 The conditions for pooling are only satisfied if  [] () 9 . 0 , 6 . 0 , 3 . 0 = ∈ q γ  or () 8 . 0 , 7 . 0 ≥ ≥ q γ    11
In the aggregate supply function, unanticipated inflation persistence affects the output 
gap and thus future expectations weight less than past expectations of current inflation. In 
Walsh, a strong central banker is expected to drive output growth to levels below the trend in 
the second period of a pooling equilibrium, whereas under homogeneous information sets, the 
conservative central banker may in some cases generate output growth above trend levels. 
This result is particularly important, not only from a theoretical viewpoint, but also to give 
further support to Cukierman and Liviatan (1991)’s argument that by observing output 
expansions above trend levels one cannot immediately conclude that the central bank was 
lenient with inflation. 
  Under discretion, the economy will not always expand. This new theoretical result 
may explain why several countries experienced high inflation with deep economic recessions 
in the 80’s. 
Finally, optimal inflation is higher with homogeneous information sets, which implies 
that the power of time inconsistency is higher here than in Walsh (2000).  
   12
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